Boko Haram: 10 Lessons From Biafra

NIGERIANS have continued to be inundated with the
ever chilly tales of the deaths of scores of innocent
citizens on daily basis in the hands of Boko Haram
insurgents in the North-East. The way out of this
trouble has obviously become the pre-occupation
of many having realized that it is better to think and
proffer solutions than fold arms and blame the
government in newspaper publications,
demonstrations and public statements. The Buni
Yadi massacre of FGC students left so much bad
taste in the mouth and evoked in me memories of
the Nigeria civil war which started when I was
barely 10 years old. In those 30 months of my
boyhood marred by war which I luckily survived,
there are experiences to be shared for the benefit
of the children and parents living in the
northeastern part of Nigeria now traumatized by
Boko Haram. There are also memories that can
benefit the military leaders fighting Boko Haram
insurgency even when it has come from an
ordinary civilian who experienced war as
a boy. Yes, Nigeria fought a civil war for 30 months
at the end of which the secession of the former
Eastern Region (Biafra) was brutally stopped. The
objective was to keep the country one and the end
justified all the means employed. In relation to the
current insurgency which now has all the trappirigs
of real war, the first lesson to be drawn from the
civil war was the Federal Government's
galvanization of the entire citizenry against the
people of Biafra with a slogan devoid of ethnic or
religious colouration.To keep Nigeria one.' To
defeat Biafra, therefore, became a movement
keyed in to by all Nigerians other than those on the
side of secessionist Biafra. This national
consciousness was the most lethal weapon in the
hands of Gen. Yakubu Gowon and his military. In
the current war against terror, national
consciousness against Boko Haram is yet to
emerge despite the unending bloodshed. It is
probably because some Nigerians seem to see the
problem as Goodluck Jonathan's challenge and
which they pray becomes the albatross that will
make him abandon power. Others who are
saddened by the deaths of fellow Nigerian citizens
in the Northeast look forward to seeing a non
partisan and humanitarian movement against the
insurgency that will draw them in and add strength
and grassroots appeal to what the residency is
doing. Crushing momentum With the two positions,
it means the level of national consciousness
needed to confront and defeat Boko Haram is not
yet crystallized. Even as I commend the current
achievements of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Lt.
Gen. Kenneth Minimah who has since relocated to
Bornu State, we need from all Nigerians a heart
that will generate a consciousness with crushing
momentum against Boko Haram. The second
lesson from the civil war is the seeming poor
awareness of the civilian population in the Boko
Haram affected zone of the monumental dangers
they face. This was unlike the situation in Biafra
where internal propaganda sensitized everyone of
the imminence of death in the hands of "vandals".
The popular radio jingle still engraved in my brain
was: a time of genocide is a time for vigilance;
Biafra be vigilant! Consequent upon this, people
were engaged in dog sleep (i.e. with one eye
open). Even as a primary five pupil in 1967, we
were taught how to dive for cover, how to shield
from bullet and how to craw! to safety in the face
of attack from land or air. We were clearly tutored
to understand that to run was to DIE. Our mothers
were taught not to look for their children but save
their lives first. Family bunkers where members hid
during air raids were constructed. With these, we
survived many bomb attacks. It is doubtful if our
citizens facing the wrath of Boko Haram in the
northeast villages have been exposed to some
current trainings considering how they react to
attacks and the consequential death tolls. They
should be trained to expect sudden attack and
advised on how to respond whenever it happens.
Apparent injury The third lesson is the evacuation
of people in danger of apparent injury to safety. As
a boy in 1968, I lived with people who were
evacuated from war endangered communities of
Biafra including people from Udi and Nsukka in the
present day Enugu state and Ogoni from the
present day Rivers State. One therefore wonders
why people in border communities of Adamawa,
Borno and Yobe states being massacred by Boko
Haram daily cannot be evacuated to safe refugee
camps. If Biafra could do it in 1967, obviously
Nigeria can in 2014. Besides securing the
endangered people, it affords the military and
intelligence organs the opportunity of appropriately
executing their offensive without fear of
unnecessary casualties. The fourth lesson is the
protection of school children as much as
practicable from disasters consequent upon war
strife or civil commotion. This is necessary
because the children are the future who will grow
to rebuild the city destroyed by wars fought by
parents. When air raids on Biafra territory became
too severe in 1968, schools were closed to protect
the children of Biafra and when they were
reopened in 1969 children and their teachers
studied under tree shades instead of the highly
exposed school premises. The emphasis was the
protection of the children. With the vicious Boko
Haram operating in the north east of the country
and focusing on soft targets, schools should be
closed and children relocated to areas where
safety , may be guaranteed until normalcy returns.
The fifth lesson bothers on military strategy. In our
boy soldiering, we were thought to blow the bridge
of disaster and I want to believe this is a long
tested operational pattern in warfare. With Boko
Haram operating from along our borders with Chad
and Cameroun Republics, the borders should be
closed. This cuts off the enemy's supply line and
weakens the operational capacity of members
within the national boundaries. The sixth lesson is
the need for the military to leverage on native
intelligence. Intelligence by the natives of various
communities was the cornerstone of Biafran
military intelligence. In every community, the good
and the bad are well known by the people.
Indigenes and strangers can be differentiated and
movements interpreted. With careful investigation,
it may be that communities severely attacked by
Boko Haram in the North-East have bad leadership
which led their youth into deviant behavior of
joining the insurgent group. The attack may well
represent a punitive payback on such community
leaders. THE seventh lesson is the special role the
sacrifice made by indigenes of communities in
military service played in the survival of such
communities during the civil war. Biafran soldiers
were allowed the priviledge of electing to lead the
defence of their towns and villages in the face of
enemy invasion. The local communities usually
collaborated effectively with their sons who would
do everything to save their kith and kin from
calamity. I continue to wonder how a soldier who
hails from one of the Borno State villages affected
by the Boko Haram attacks and serving in Lagos
would feel hearing that not less than a hundred of
his kinsmen perhaps including his parents,
brothers and sisters have been massacred. He
certainly would have loved to play a role in saving
them given the opportunity. The eighth lesson is
the necessity of seeking the collaboration and
support of foreign powers. To defeat Biafra, Nigeria
got the support of such countries as Britain, USSR
(Russian) and USA. The propaganda oozing out of
this global support helped to bring Biafra to its
knees. In the face of Boko Haram insurgency,
Nigeria may seek the support and collaboration of
countries that have economic ties with it. The
nineth lesson is the possibility of hiring foreign
experts (war mercenaries) to assist our military in
certain areas of special need. Most of the military
pilots that flew fighter jets during the civil war were
expatriates and since we are now faced with a
special kind of enemy, people with special skills
may be recruited from outside the shores of
Nigeria. The tenth lesson is the necessity of
keeping discussion and negotiation with the enemy
ongoing. Nigeria never abandoned any opportunity
of dialoging with Biafra much as her military was
on an assault mission. As faceless as Boko Haram
is, the government of Nigeria should continue to
seek its face. Hopefully, it would be found
someday. The above lessons from Biafra are for
the authorities to consider in line with current and
peculiar trends in the Boko Haram insurgency.
Beyond this expectation, ordinary Nigerians
together with non-governmental, faith-based and
corporate organizations should address the
humanitarian fallouts of the terrorism challenge.
Counter terrorism in this regard means national
solidarity with victims of Boko Haram insurgency
devoid of unnecessary politicization and driven by
freewill gifts of cash, food, clothing and shelter. To
show such concern will no doubt strengthen our
nationhood which Boko Haram seeks to destroy.
Meanwhile, the world is watching our behavior. By
Chief Felix Amadi